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ESSAY
MY HEALTH POLICY NIGHTMARE
A Commentary by Joseph Whitet
ABSTRACT
Imagine that the United States did not have universal public
education. What would the politics of extending access to
education look like? It might have a nightmarish cast but also
look rather familiar. Thinking about that yields some disturb-
ing implications about the politics of health reform and, in
particular, the politics of universal coverage within the broad-
er policy discussion about "health reform."
You know how it is. When you are tired and working hard and a
bunch of things are going on at once, sometimes you reprocess it all in
your dreams, and things get jumbled together in strange ways. Usual-
ly I do not remember those dreams, but I had one during the 2008
election season that stuck with me - maybe because it was so frighten-
ing, and maybe because it seemed as much like a prophecy as a
dream.
It was curriculum night for my daughter's school, and all the
usual parental anxieties were high. Some of our friends have switched
their children to private schools, even though my community has a
decades-old reputation for superb education, as evidenced by the col-
lege destinations of high school graduates. Partly it is because those
friends think private might be better anyway; partly it is because our
system does not score so well on the Ohio Achievement Tests; and
partly it is because, in a desperate effort to improve those scores, our
school administrators have directed teachers to begin teaching to tests,
designing the curriculum around these tests.
At the same time, I had been preparing talks about the prospects
for health care reform, both for my course and for extracurricular
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events. So, as a good member of the health policy community, I had
been assiduously keeping up with the literature, especially with
Health Affairs.
I fell into a fitful sleep sometime after midnight, and this was my
dream, or nightmare.
I dreamed we did not have universal public education in the
United States. Instead, our education was financed like healthcare.
There were many schools, some better and some worse. Over the
years, employers had concluded that employees cared greatly about
education for their children, and so most provided educational benefits
for their employees' children. Originally, many had operated their
own schools, but eventually almost all employers instead had begun
providing vouchers for educational costs. So most students' education
was paid for by those benefits; but they varied in generosity and, of
course, with employment. Large employers were sometimes able to
get discounted contracts with networks of schools, but employers va-
ried in both their networks and how much of the tuition they paid.
Many small employers paid nothing. I was lucky - my university had
a good plan, and my Abby was going to a good school. But there was
talk of reducing the benefit.
Other people were not so lucky. Our friends the Greens were only
intermittently employed in Ohio's declining economy. Gina mainly
did substitute teaching (ironically) for one school corporation, and
Jack could only find steady work doing tax accounting from January
through April. So their daughter Sarah was not able to go to school.
She was being homeschooled, as best her mother and father could
manage. Sharon Gray, a single mother we knew, was able to send
Charles and Justin to school because Ohio had created a special pro-
gram for poor people, called Educaid. But it only paid a limited
amount. So Sharon had to drive her sons out of her neighborhood to
the nearest remotely decent school that would accept them, and in this
case, that meant thirty-two students per class and not enough text-
books. When Sharon was sick, she would try to find a neighbor to
drive her children to school; if she could not, then her children simply
had to stay home too.
Educaid was limited because most voters were able to take care of
education, most of the time, through their employment. A few could
even pay directly out of pocket. So the voters and their legislators
were only willing to spend tax dollars for the "truly needy" - and that
did not include Gina and Jack Green, or their Sarah. Proposals to
guarantee education to all school children were beaten back by a se-
ries of arguments. Parents whose children were getting pretty good
education funded by their employers worried that government educa-
tion would be as poor as the Educaid system, causing their sons and
424 HEAL TH MA TRIX [Vol. 20:423
MY HEALTH POLICY NIGHTMARE
daughters to be much worse off. Others worried about paying more
taxes. Even owners and managers of companies that might benefit by
having education taken off their books worried because they disliked
government in principle and did not want to make it any stronger.
Naturally, liberals continually dreamed of universal education.
They could point to many studies that demonstrated the negative con-
sequences of the status quo. Since education was mostly privatized,
nobody had exact figures. But an annual Census Bureau survey, as
well as other data, indicated that, at any given time, perhaps twenty
percent of the school-age population was not in school. A large body
of research showed that children who were not in school learned less;
that as a result they had worse job prospects and life chances. Liber-
als pointed out that every other advanced industrial democracy had
universal public education, and these countries also had better trained
workforces, more equal incomes, and even spent less on education. It
turned out that the United States spent a great deal on education be-
cause nobody was in charge of the system, cost was viewed as a sign
of quality, entrepreneurs started all sorts of schools with fancy equip-
ment to try to attract the parents with good education benefits from
their employers, extensive marketing and advertising wars were used
to get those customers, and a series of other reasons. Some evidence
showed that, when parents who had been without education benefits
for a while found new jobs with benefits and were able to enroll their
children in school again, those children required extensive and expen-
sive remedial help. Some advocates for universal education therefore
argued that it would not be quite as expensive as it sounded because
the reduced need for emergency remedial teaching would result in
savings.
Far more than twenty percent of students, of course, would be out
of school for some period during the traditional thirteen years of kin-
dergarten (which some children missed), primary, and secondary edu-
cation. But some people were used to that. It was the norm. Besides,
a lot of voters had secure enough lives that it did not happen to their
children: even during a short spell of unemployment, these parents
could pay the tuition, temporarily, out of pocket. The federal gov-
ernment had passed a law requiring that employers and schools allow
parents in that situation to pay the discounted tuition negotiated by
that employer for the next eighteen months. This discounted amount
would be a lot of money but much less than if the parents had to pay
the posted tuition rate. And sometimes - especially if the unemploy-
ment occurred late in the year and the school administrators did not
know - the student would finish out the year and the school would get
stuck with bad debt when the company did not pay the balance. As
for the students who missed a year or two - well, some of the parents
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did not expect their children to go to a good college anyway, so these
parents did not protest. When parents and their children were
accepted to colleges, despite the disadvantages, the colleges often had
to provide emergency remedial education to make up for the effects of
the previous shortages in the routine primary and secondary educa-
tion.
I was so scared for Abby in my dream. It seemed so irrational.
My job was safe - I am a tenured full professor at one of the top uni-
versities in the country. But what if I died? What then? And what
about Sarah Green, and Charlie and Justin Gray? What about them
and what kind of nightmares might their parents have?
But, in my dream, the Democrats had captured Congress and the
Presidency, and the forces for universal public education had rallied
again. I had to give a talk about what would happen, since I am a
political scientist, and my university's School of Education was hav-
ing a big forum in a few weeks.
The new President was campaigning hard for education reform.
In the election, the Democratic party platform declared, if one thing
came through in the platform hearings, it was that Democrats are unit-
ed around a commitment to provide universal, affordable, K-12 edu-
cation. In meeting after meeting, people expressed moral outrage with
an education system that leaves millions of American children unable
to go to school and millions more with their parents struggling despe-
rately to pay the bills. Whether Democrats really were united, how-
ever, could be doubted. It appeared that Democratic legislators from
more conservative and rural districts had their reservations.
The conservative forces were opposed, as they had always been,
for a whole series of reasons. They talked about "big government,"
"Washington bureaucrats," and "freedom." They also spread fear.
They said students in the countries with universal public education
often could not get into good colleges, or had to wait for textbooks.
They said that some even came to private schools in the United States.
In the election, they had proposed to eliminate the employer subsidies
for tuition, replace them with a modest tax credit from the federal
government, and provide special Home Schooling Accounts (HSAs)
so parents could buy private tutoring and computer learning programs.
Although the public and commentators appeared to insist that politi-
cians try to be "bipartisan," and the President had proposed much
more modest reforms than some of his coalition preferred, the differ-
ence in the two parties' views was quite large.
I had to figure that at least eighty percent of Congress would be
committed one way or the other: forty percent would be Republicans
who would vote against almost anything that approached being a
major expansion of public support for K-12 education, and about forty
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percent would be Democrats who would (after a lot of grumbling)
vote for something resembling what their president and party leaders
and committee leaders agreed on. That left a bunch of cross-pressured
legislators in the middle. Some would want to do it but be scared of
the costs. These congressmen cared about education and unequal
opportunities but worried about the federal budget at least as much. A
very small group would be Republicans who were a bit scared to de-
viate from their party and did not like government. But they thought
the situation might be getting too bad to bear any longer and this
group had districts that could go either way in the next election. Some
would be Democrats who had large education companies in their dis-
tricts and were worried that universal public education would elimi-
nate jobs. Or they had friends in the private education industry whom
they trusted and who gave them many reasons to hesitate. They
would worry about criticisms, from the Republicans or from the pri-
vate education industry, of a "government takeover of education" -
how it would have all sorts of confusing rules and eliminate choice of
schools. The people who would benefit were not as organized as the
people who would lose.
And so, I was planning to say as I dreamed, it would come down
to what it often does in politics: a group of cross-pressured legislators.
In my dream, and I do not think only in dreams, legislators want to do
good but also want to limit political risks. They will take risks, but
they have to be sure that the policy is worth the risks. So they look to
consultants and trusted advisors to inform them about the political
risks, and they look to expert communities to inform them about the
policy consequences.
That is where the dream, already fitful and frightful, turned into a
real nightmare. For I dreamed that a moderate legislator - say, a con-
servative Democrat from North Carolina - asked some of her aides to
go through the research literature and tell her what it said.
She knew the vote on healthcare reform could be the most impor-
tant vote of her career in Congress, both for policy reasons and for
political risk, and she wanted to get it right. So they went off to the
journals.
Education was such a mess that policymakers sought desperately
for new "solutions" that would not anger powerful interest groups,
and employers sought ideas that would save them from choosing
between paying ever-higher costs and infuriating employees by cut-
ting benefits. In response to these twin government and corporate
demands, a large group of researchers called "education service
researchers" had grown up around universities and think tanks. Edu-
cation service researchers argued that education would be more
affordable if it were organized differently, or if teachers had better
2010] 427
guidelines about how to teach, and had convinced Congress to create a
federal Agency for Education Research and Organization (AERO).
The agency and research community had a flagship journal, Education
Services Research. Some of its content was useful, but often it had
too many equations. Among many other journals in the field, the
most prominent and widely read among policy elites was Education
Affairs, which called itself the "journal of the education policy
sphere," and just about was. The congresswoman's office even
subscribed so that it could look at the copious Web publications and
keep up to date.
Other government agencies also conducted research on education.
Because Educaid was a state/federal partnership and the federal gov-
ernment was worried about costs, Congress had created an Education
Payment Advisory Commission (EdPAC). The Congressional Budget
Office (CBO) did a lot of reports; the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) did a lot of reports. With so many reports, it seemed
like it might be more useful to meet with some of the experts, and so
the congresswoman's office set up meetings, because the congress-
woman really wanted to get it right. And this is what she learned, or
at least these were the impressions she took away, from what was in
the journals and the briefings and the policy community as a whole.
She learned that there was quite good evidence of the damage
done by intermittent education. The conservatives were wrong when
they said that most children learned even if they did not get to school
and that the remedial programs made up any difference. She learned
that there indeed were big differences in life chances according to
access to education. She was less sure about the data regarding other
countries. She did not like to conclude that the United States was not
the greatest country in the world, and she knew she could not make
that argument to a lot of her constituents anyway, even if it were true,
because they do not like to hear their country criticized. But she
thought it might be true, so that evidence made her a little more
willing to cast a risky vote, if she had to.
On the whole, the research literature about universal K-12 educa-
tion said universal public education would be a good idea. Yet a lot
of other education policy literature made the congresswoman worry
whether it was worth the risks.
She learned that many experts believed that what mattered was
not simply what schools did but, logically enough, what students
leamed. It turned out that what students learned, according to a lot of
research, had more to do with their home lives and their behavior than
with their schooling. There was a whole "public knowledge" com-
munity, and many of these scholars argued that too much attention
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was paid to the "education" model; even to the "education-industrial
complex."
A more liberal version of the "public knowledge" community said
that all sorts of aspects of society, such as what was on television and
even inequality itself, had big effects on knowledge. For example,
students who started out poor knew they had lesser prospects than
richer kids, and so the poor students were less likely to believe they
could derive a benefit from education. Therefore, these students were
less likely to apply themselves, whether or not they attended good
schools. The stress of their impoverished lives made it harder to con-
centrate on schooling anyway, and then corporate America was trying
to dumb them down through television.
A more conservative version said that students' learning depended
on the values they learned from parents and churches; that all the
money in the world spent on public education would do little good if
the students did not have better values from their homes; that the
schools could not teach the behaviors that led to learning; and that, if
children learned those behaviors from their parents, they could study
at home and advance even if they had to miss a year or two of formal
schooling.
These public knowledge arguments, from both left and right, left
our congresswoman worrying that she might vote for a big, expensive
public program, get lots of constituents mad at her, and not improve
peoples' life chances so much after all. She noticed the arguments of
both the liberals who said that too much was spent on education and
not enough on other public knowledge programs, such as better public
TV, and the conservatives, who said that too much spending through
bureaucracies missed the real problem, which was individual values
and behavior. If either of them was right, maybe universal public
education would not do so much good after all.
The Congresswoman's staff also learned about a whole lot of
education services research that revealed immense variations in edu-
cational practices. Some schools paid teachers more and some less;
some had many more hours of class than others; some emphasized
math, some science, and some English. The only evident explanations
of these variations involved factors such as how many trained science
teachers taught in the local schools (areas with more science teachers
offered more specialized science classes) or pure local custom. Rela-
tively similar cities in New England, for example, had very different
education practices and different levels of costs - everything except
different levels of young peoples' knowledge as measured by tests.
Education Affairs had recently anointed the most eminent of the re-
searchers in this line of work as the most influential "education policy
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researcher of the past 25 years." Almost all of the experts insisted that
these were very important findings. But what did they mean?
It seemed to mean, in essence, that teachers had no idea what they
were doing and very little evidence that any of it worked. The con-
gresswoman's aides found endless articles discovering that education
practices were barely based on evidence at all; reformers had been
talking about "evidence-based education" for decades and complain-
ing about its absence for just as long. A lot of researchers argued that,
even if better evidence of education effectiveness could be found, that
was the wrong question. What ought to matter was cost-effectiveness
of education practices, and despite hundreds or thousands of articles
in the journals calling for more cost-effectiveness, there had been
hardly any implementation of such ideas in practice.
All of this research and commentary, from the public knowledge
arguments to the cost-effectiveness research, suggested that the educa-
tion system was broken. EdPAC announced that even the government
programs, which seemed in some ways to be working better than the
rest of the system, were horribly flawed and would become unafford-
able unless they did a better job of relating resources to results. It
called for "Pay for Performance" ("P4P") in education, and that
sounded promising, until the staff told their boss that EdPACs own
reports showed very little evidence of improvement from the trials
that had occurred. It had been used some in the United Kingdom,
supposedly, but the main effect had been to spend a lot more money.
So our congresswoman became even more worried. If all those
articles in Education Affairs and elsewhere were to be believed,
spending more money to create universal public education would be
much like tossing money into the ocean. Some experts - there was
one group called the Common Good Fund that had many impressive
reports - insisted both that universal public education was so impor-
tant that it should come first, and that "P4P" and many other proposals
were very promising. But the congresswoman had to wonder whether
it might be much more fiscally responsible to get education working
better before spending lots of scarce federal dollars, dollars that might
require raising taxes on her constituents, to finance such an inefficient,
irrational system.
But maybe, she thought, her aides were looking in the wrong
places. Or bringing her the wrong experts. The congresswoman was
worried about the budget, so maybe she should focus on the econo-
mists' opinions.
She and her aides learned that economists were quite divided on
many issues. Yet there seemed wide agreement, even among many
economists she thought of as "liberals," on a surprising premise.
Almost all seemed to agree that one of the major causes of inefficien-
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cy was the fact that employers provided tuition benefits and
nobody paid taxes on those benefits. But the employment tuition ben-
efits were the main thing that made the education system function at
all, for most of her constituents. They would be terrified of having it
taken away. Yet some of the most eminent education economists in
the country insisted that this linchpin of the existing system was fun-
damentally irrational, unfair, and excessively expensive. They
seemed to agree with the Republicans that the whole system should be
blown up, and that her own party leadership's proposal was funda-
mentally misguided. If they were right, she had two choices. She
could follow their advice, and vote for a plan that included their kind
of recommendations. But that would scare many of her constituents
to death, and it seemed exceedingly risky as policy too. Or, she could
ignore their advice, and vote for something like her new president was
proposing, which actually mandated that more employers contribute
towards the cost of tuition. Yet how could she, a moderate Democrat
who worried about fiscal responsibility, vote for a program that so
many economists, including many associated with her party, thought
was bad economics?
Of one thing she was sure: that reform should not add to the fed-
eral deficit. She was quite sure of something else as well - that most
of the reform should not be paid for with taxes on her constituents. So
it was important to pay for reform with savings to existing programs,
and by preventing the new coverage from being too expensive. Could
that be done?
She found endless proposals in the journals and from eminent
commissions to save money from "P4P," education information tech-
nology, comparative effectiveness research, and many other things
that sounded nice in principle. But CBO reported that hardly any of
these ideas would save much money, if any, over the next ten years.
When she had her staff look closer, they found that, in fact, the advo-
cates for these ideas had not explained how they would work, nor had
they provided examples of them working, that a responsible budget
estimator would believe.
Our congresswoman was conflicted: what was the safe, what was
the ethical, thing to do? Maybe she would just have to swallow hard
and make a "tough choice." Her staff told her that many education
ethicists agreed, and the "tough choice" should be to accept that some
children were too dumb or disadvantaged to be educated. Govern-
ment should not spend a lot of extra money on hopeless cases. Her
staff also told her that the Republicans were raising anger in her dis-
trict by claiming that education reform would mean the government
would "ration" education. It occurred to her that there might be a
connection between the expert commentary and the political charge.
2010] 43 1
Then I woke up.
By the time this is published, I suppose we will all have woken
up. We will know how most legislators who resemble the conflicted
representative in my dreams voted. But I think it is pretty clear what
my subconscious, or the God of Political Analysis, or some force was
trying to tell me, Joseph, in my dream.
It was telling me, first, that with our current politics we might not
even have universal K-12 education if we did not already have it.
That is pretty scary. But it was also telling me something about the
political effects of the health policy sphere.
Ask yourself this question: if all the kinds of research I found in
my dream existed when universal public education was established,
what are the odds it would have been established?
I think the odds would have been quite low. The kind of research
I dreamed about does exist (and similar arguments are made) for edu-
cation now. These arguments surely make it more difficult to increase
funding for public education. They do not prevent it from existing
because it already exists. Back in the nineteenth century, there was no
education services research community, nor public knowledge com-
munity, nor many education policy journals, nor even many econo-
mists (and their economists did not have the same doctrines).
But we do have the health services research community, and pub-
lic health community, and health policy journals, and lots of econo-
mists. And I do not see how anyone can read Health Affairs without
worrying that, with so much so terribly wrong with the health care
system, according to so many experts, investing taxpayers' money in
the system to expand access would be irresponsible. Readers might
well conclude that the other problems should be fixed first, or all the
problems should be fixed at once - perhaps taking "triple aim" at care,
health, and cost.
The trouble is, "fixing" many of. those other problems could take a
very long time (since nobody knows how, for example, to transform
provider payment to "P4P"). So taking triple aim means waiting a
long time to hit the target that we actually know how to hit, namely
covering people.2 Calling on the political system to fix more than the
insurance aspect of health care makes an already exceedingly difficult
challenge impossibly hard. The passage of national health insurance
legislation is not made any easier by all the commentary from
1 Donald M. Berwick et al., The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27
HEALTH AFFAIRS 759 (2008).
2 Joseph White, Three Meanings of Capacity; Or Why the Federal Govern-
ment is Most Likely to Lead on Health Insurance Access Issues, 28 J. HEALTH POL.
PoL'Y & L. 217 (2003).
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advocates for public health, quality improvement, or other agendas
that universal coverage is only part of the needed change.
What matters politically is not whether comprehensive reform of
many aspects of the health care system at once is possible in theory.
What matters is doubt. What matters is overload - making a situation
so complicated that politicians cannot imagine coping with all the
parts. What matters is excuses for saying "No." What matters is rea-
sons to worry that the political costs of voting for a major, controver-
sial reform could be paid without doing all that much good anyway.
What matters is the perception that experts think national health insur-
ance is just one among many problems in a highly flawed system.
And anyone who just counted the pages in Health Affairs, or looked at
the lead articles over the years, would be assaulted with doubts,
threatened by overload, overwhelmed by complexity, given many
excuses to vote "No," and buried in an avalanche of claims that the
system that some reformers want to make available to all is horribly
irrational and flawed.
The kinds of arguments and implications I encountered about
education in my nightmare are in fact drawn by opponents of
universal health insurance. The 2008 Republican platform posed
public health measures as a superior alternative to a "government-run
universal health care system." It declared that "we can reduce de-
mand for medical care by fostering personal responsibility within a
culture of wellness, while increasing access to preventive services,
including nutrition and breakthrough medications that keep people
healthy and out of the hospital," while calling for a "national gras-
sroots campaign against obesity."3 Moreover, at the White House
Health Summit on February 25, 2010, Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK)
argued that excess care should be eliminated and prevention improved
first, before any attempt to expand coverage.4 Liberal public health
advocates may see public health and national health insurance initia-
tives as complementary to each other, but that is not obvious at all to
conservatives, and need not be obvious to anyone else. The conserva-
tive call for "consumer-directed" health care plays off much of the
Health Services Research community's argument that patients should
be "empowered" with more choices about their care.
How, I have to ask, could anyone expect a relatively neutral legis-
lator, trying to do good, but not willing to take political risks unless
3 Republican Nat'l Comm., 2008 Republican Platforn, http://platform.gop
.com/2008Platform.pdf (last visited May 3, 2010).
4 Kaiser Health News, Transcript: White House Health Summit, Morning
Session (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/February/25/
health-care-reform-transcript.aspx.
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she is sure of the good that will be done, to vote for national health
insurance after reading Health Affairs, learning about John Wennberg
and the literature about how health care services vary for no obviously
good reason from community to community, hearing all about the
weak evidence base, reading all the public health literature about med-
ical care being less important than other things, and all the economics
that focuses on the evils of the tax subsidies?5
It is fairly easy to interpret my dream. Economists, health servic-
es researchers and public health advocates, simply by doing what they
think is their job - promoting their views and filling the journals with
their arguments and agendas - make the most basic and justified
reform, guarantee of health care to all citizens, less likely.
My dream identified plenty of other, more widely understood, ob-
stacles. In my nightmare and in reality, about forty percent of legisla-
tors - almost all of the Republicans - were opposed to universal
health coverage for reasons such as their ideologies, which groups
they preferred to favor, or not wanting to help the Democrats get
a "victory." Yet what mattered in my dream, and what matters in
reality, is those legislators on the fence or at the margins; and at the
margins the total effect of the health policy community - its research
and its discourse - is, whatever the intent of its participants, a barrier
to passing national health insurance.
By the time this paper is read, a law to expand health insurance
coverage either will or will not have passed. It will not guarantee
insurance coverage for all Americans, but it might be a major expan-
sion. It may or may not actually get implemented.
There will be a lot of political commentary about why it suc-
ceeded or why it failed, or why it was so close. But I am sure of one
thing: the effort to pass a decent bill will have been made more diffi-
cult by the continual arguments in the health policy community about
the need to focus on public health or quality or reducing variations or
changing incentives for health care providers or changing individual
behaviors or paying for performance or virtually anything else that
could be conceived from some analytic perspective. The effort to pass
legislation would have been easier if that advocacy did not exist at all,
and the question for experts reduced simply to: "would this be a better
5 The latter argument especially is puzzling in its own right. It assumes the
cost problem is "excessive" insurance, even though there are plenty of countries
where the benefit packages are at least comparable, cost-sharing is lower, and medical
care is much less expensive. The tax preference argument also makes questionable
assumptions about the distribution of compensation within an employer's workforce
absent the health insurance benefit, but that is too complex a matter to discuss here.
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health care system and a better country if everyone had decent insur-
ance?"
The massive health policy literature addressing other issues does
consider real problems. Medical care is not the only factor in health,
quality could use a great deal of improvement, and policy might
address those issues.6 The effect of that literature on the campaign for
universal coverage was, and will be in the future, an unintended con-
sequence (except when used by the opponents of coverage expansion,
as in the Republican platform cited above). But that just means that,
in the real world of politics, one set of legitimate concerns can threat-
en another.7 Good people trying to do good can inadvertently do
harm to a cause in which many of them believe.
Which means I was not having a nightmare. As a health policy
analyst, I have been living in one: my profession has, to a great extent,
been doing more harm than good. Bioethicist promotion of the need
to ration at the end of life fed commentary about death panels.
Advocacy for unproven cost controls left the administration claiming
savings that the Congressional Budget Office would not confirm.
Promotion of prevention and of the need to fix "variations" gave
Republicans an argument for delaying coverage expansions. The defi-
nition of the "problem" was muddied in a way that made it very diffi-
6 Which is not to say that all of that literature is wise even in its own terms.
For example, the advocacy for "P4P" is, ironically, not based on much in the way of
evidence or performance; and some of the public health agenda asks the political
system to do things that are far less politically plausible than even universal health
coverage. See White, supra note 2.
It would be nice if the analysts who write about all the other problems but
believe national health insurance is also important would begin all their papers and
testimony with a "by the way, please remember we ought to cover everybody first."
The Commonwealth Fund, in its broadest overviews, emphasizes this point, or at least
argues that other desirable reforms "would be even more effective" if combined with
universal health coverage. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND COMM'N ON A HIGH
PERFORMANCE HEALTH Sys., A HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE UNITED
STATES: AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA FOR THE NEXT PRESIDENT (2007),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr doc/Ambitious Agenda 1075.pdfsection
-4039; CATHY SCHOEN ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, BENDING THE CURVE:
OPTIONS FOR ACHIEVING SAVINGS AND IMPROVING VALUE IN U.S. HEALTH SPENDING
(2007), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr doc/Schoen bendingthecurve_1080
.pdfsection=4039. Yet researchers are supposed to report on their work and its con-
clusions, so the norms of the disciplines for good reason would reject such asides.
Narrower papers, even by Commonwealth, quite reasonably emphasize the narrower
concerns. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND COMM'N ON A HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH
Sys., FRAMEWORK FOR A HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE UNITED
STATES (2006), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr-doc/Commission-framework
highperformance 943.pdfsection=4039.
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cult for the Democrats to explain why their version of reform was
necessary.
This article was edited early March of 2010. My readers will
know whether these obstacles were somewhat overcome, and mea-
ningful legislation was passed. But no one should imagine that the
vast bulk of the health policy commentary in recent years helped solve
the nightmares endured by tens of millions of uninsured Americans.
